However, the comparison between early modern European state formation and contemporary problems in fragile states is fundamentally flawed. The context has changed to such an extent that the parallel cannot be drawn. There are at least two major differences between then and now. First, the wars that led to statebuilding in the past were external wars, fought with other states, whereas most of today’s wars are civil wars. The consequences of these civil wars are in many ways the complete opposite of statebuilding: they destroy the national economy, cause productive middle classes to flee, divide up the nation into competing identity groups, and lead to a crumbling of state institutions and taxation capacity. Contemporary wars do not build states, they distintegrate them.

The second major difference is globalisation. Current-day civil wars do not occur in isolation, but are in many ways connected to global processes. Just think of the impact of rich countries’ quest for natural resources, or the War on Terror, or the international division of labour, or trade barriers, or global price shocks, or transnational criminal networks... External factors play important roles in causing and prolonging these wars, and therefore external involvement is needed in ending them. (If for no other reason, then at least out of self-interest: the ramifications of these wars can be felt across the world in the form of refugee flows, trade shocks and even terrorist attacks.)

This is not to say that states can be built purely from the outside, or that statebuilding interventions are easy. Efforts to stimulate peace- and statebuilding need to take much better account of local power structures, capacities, and opinions. Imposing alien democratic systems, as we now know, does not work. Neither, indeed, does creating neo-protectorates that depend on the international community for their survival. But standing back and waiting for wars to lead to statebuilding has very little chance of success either.